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Abstract—In voting, disputes arise when a voter claims that
the voting authority is dishonest and did not correctly process his
ballot while the authority claims to have followed the protocol.
A dispute can be resolved if any third party can unambigu-
ously determine who is right. We systematically characterize
all relevant disputes for a generic, practically relevant, class of
voting protocols. Based on our characterization, we propose a
new definition of dispute resolution for voting that accounts for
the possibility that both voters and the voting authority can make
false claims and that voters may abstain from voting.
A central aspect of our work is timeliness: a voter should
possess the evidence required to resolve disputes no later than the
election’s end. We characterize what assumptions are necessary
and sufficient for timeliness in terms of a communication topology
for our voting protocol class. We formalize the dispute resolution
properties and communication topologies symbolically. This pro-
vides the basis for verification of dispute resolution for a broad
class of protocols. To demonstrate the utility of our model, we
analyze a mixnet-based voting protocol and prove that it satisfies
dispute resolution as well as verifiability and receipt-freeness.
To prove our claims, we combine machine-checked proofs with
traditional pen-and-paper proofs.
I. INTRODUCTION
For a society to accept a voting procedure, the public must
believe that the system implementing it works as intended,
that is, the system must be trustworthy. This is essential as
elections involve participants from opposing political parties
that may neither trust each other nor the election authority.
Nevertheless, there must be a consensus on the final outcome,
including whether the election is valid. This requires that
voters and auditors can verify that the protocol proceeds
as specified and detect any manipulations, even if they do
not trust the authority running the election. To achieve this,
the information relevant for checking verifiability may be
published in a publicly accessible database, known as the
bulletin board.
a) The need for dispute resolution: Ballots are cast
privately in elections. Thus only the voters themselves know
if and how they voted. If a voter claims that his ballot is
incorrectly recorded or that he was hindered in recording his
ballot, no other party can know, a priori, whether the voter is
lying or if there was a problem for which the voting authority
is responsible. We call such unresolved situations disputes.
When a dispute occurs, the honest parties must be protected.
That is, an honest voter who detects some manipulation must
be able to convince third parties that the authority was dishon-
est.1 In particular, when a voter checks whether his cast ballot
is correctly recorded, then either this is the case (respectively,
no ballot is recorded when he abstained from voting) or he
can convince others that the authority was dishonest. Another
problem is when a voter cannot even proceed in the protocol
to perform such checks, for instance when he is not provided
with a necessary confirmation. Hence, a timeliness guarantee
must ensure by the election’s end that an honest voter’s ballot
is correctly recorded or there is evidence that proves to any
third party that the authority is dishonest. Finally, in addition
to protecting the honest voters from a dishonest authority, the
honest authority must be protected from voters making false
accusations. That is, when the authority is honest, no one
should be able to convince others of the contrary.
b) State of the art: The vast majority of formal analyses
of remote e-voting protocols do not consider dispute resolution
at all, e.g., [1], [13], [15], [16]. Works that recognize the
importance of dispute resolution [7], [2] or that take aspects
of it into account when proposing poll-site [8], [11], [12],
[14], [17], [22], [36] or remote [37] voting protocols, reason
about it only informally. The most closely related prior works
define different notions of accountability [10], [25], [26] that
formalize which agents should be held accountable when a
protocol fails to satisfy some properties. These definitions are
very general, but have been instantiated for selected voting
protocols [10], [26], [27], [28]. The accountability properties
satisfied by these protocols do not guarantee the resolution of
all disputes considered by our dispute resolution properties.
We provide a detailed comparison of accountability and our
properties in Section VII.
c) Contributions: Our work provides a new foundation
for characterizing, reasoning about, and establishing dispute
resolution in voting. First, we systematically reason about
what disputes can arise in voting for a generic, practically
relevant, class of voting protocols. Our class comprises both
remote and poll-site voting protocols that can be electronic
or paper-based. We then focus on disputes regarding whether
the published recorded ballots correctly represent the ballots
cast by the voters. Based on our classification, we formally
define dispute resolution properties in a symbolic formal-
ism amenable to automated verification using the Tamarin
tool [30], [34]. This enables the analysis of a broad class
1Here dishonesty includes all deviations of the authority from the protocol
specification, both due to corruption or to errors.
of protocols with respect to dispute resolution. Moreover, we
identify an important new property, which we call timeliness,
requiring that when a voter’s ballot is recorded incorrectly he
has convincing evidence of this by the election’s end. This
property ensures the resolution of disputes that could not be
resolved unambiguously in prior work.
Second, we demonstrate that timeliness can only be guaran-
teed under strong assumptions (for example, some messages
must not be lost on the network) by systematically analyz-
ing what communication channels and trust assumptions are
necessary and sufficient to satisfy this property. The result
is a complete characterization of all topologies in our voting
protocol class for which timeliness holds for some protocol.
Such a characterization can guide the design of new voting
protocols where timeliness should hold, e.g., by identifying
and thereby eliminating settings where timeliness is impossi-
ble. We formally verify the claimed properties using proofs
constructed by Tamarin and pen-and-paper proofs.
Finally, to simplify establishing dispute resolution in prac-
tice, we introduce a property, called Uniqueness, that can
be checked by everyone and guarantees that each recorded
ballot was cast by a unique voter. We prove for protocols
where voters can cast at most one ballot that Uniqueness
implies guarantees for voters who abstain from voting. This
has the practical consequence that in many protocols, the
corresponding guarantees can be proven more easily. We then
present as a case study a mixnet-based voting protocol with
dispute resolution and prove that our introduced properties
hold, as well as standard voting properties such as verifiability
and receipt-freeness.
Overall, our results can be used as follows. In addition to
specifying what messages are exchanged between the different
agents, a voting protocol in our class specifies (i) how the
election’s result is computed, (ii) which verification steps are
performed, and (iii) when the authority conducting the election
is considered to have behaved dishonestly. For (i), it is required
that each protocol specifies a function Tally. For (ii), as voters
must be able to check that no ballots were wrongly recorded
for them, a function castBy must map each ballot to the voter
that has (presumably) cast it. Only if this is defined can a
voter notice when a ballot was recorded for him that he has
not cast. Finally, dispute resolution requires that a protocol
defines a dispute resolution procedure such that everyone can
agree on (iii). For this purpose, a protocol may specify a
set of executions Faulty where the authority is considered to
have behaved dishonestly and which only depends on public
information and can therefore be evaluated by everyone.
Given a protocol with a dispute resolution procedure and a
communication topology, our topology characterization can be
used to quickly conclude if the given topology is insufficient
to achieve the timeliness aspect of dispute resolution. When
this is the case, one can immediately conclude that not all
dispute resolution properties can be satisfied. When this is not
the case, our formal definitions can be used to analyze whether
all dispute resolution properties indeed hold in the protocol.
Thereby, in protocols where voters can cast at most one
ballot, the guarantees for voters who abstain can be established
directly or by showing Uniqueness and inferring them by our
results.
d) Organization: We describe our protocol model in
Section II and the class of voting protocols for which we
define our properties in Section III. In Section IV, we classify
disputes and define our dispute resolution properties. We then
analyze in Section V the communication topologies where
timeliness can be achieved. In Section VI, we show how
dispute resolution can be established in practice, introduce
Uniqueness, and present our case study. Finally, we discuss
related work in Section VII and conclude in Section VIII.
II. PROTOCOL MODEL AND SYSTEM SETUP
As is standard in model-checking, we model the protocol
and adversary as a (global) transition system. Concretely, we
use a formalism that also serves as the input language to the
Tamarin tool [30]. Our model uses abstractions that ease the
specification of communication channels with security prop-
erties and trust assumptions. These kinds of abstractions are
now fairly standard in protocol specifications. We complement
existing abstractions [4] (e.g., authentic and secure channels
and parties that satisfy different kinds of trust assumptions)
with new abstractions that are relevant for dispute resolution
(e.g., reliable channels described in Section II-E2). Our proto-
col model is inspired by the model in [5] used for e-voting. We
first introduce some terminology relevant for voting protocols
and then our protocol model.
a) Terminology: We distinguish between votes and bal-
lots. Whereas a vote is a voter’s choice in plain text, a ballot
contains the vote and possibly additional information. The
ballots’ exact design depends on the voting protocol, but it
usually consists of the vote cryptographically transformed to
ensure the vote’s authenticity or confidentiality. When a ballot
is sent by the voter, we say it is cast. We denote by the (voting)
authority the entity responsible for collecting and tallying
all voters’ ballots. Usually, both the list of collected ballots,
called the recorded ballots, and the votes in the final tally are
published on a public bulletin board that can be accessed by
voters and auditors to verify the election’s result.
A. Notation and term algebra
We write [xi]i∈{1,...,n} to denote a list of n messages of the
same kind. Similarly, we write [f(xi, yi)]i∈{1,...,n} for a list
whose elements have the same form, but may have different
values. When the index set is clear from context, we omit the
indices, e.g., we write [x] and [f(x, y)] for the above lists,
and we write [x]i and [f(x, y)]i for the ith element in the
lists. Also, we write x := y for the assignment of y to x.
Our model is based on a term algebra T that is generated
from the application of functions in a signature Σ to a set of
names N and variables V . We use the standard notation and
equational theory, given in [4, Appendix A]. The symbols we
use here are 〈p1, p2〉 for pairing two terms p1 and p2, fst(p) and
snd(p) for the first and second projection of the pair p, pk(x)
for the public key (or the verification key) associated with a
private key (or signing key) x, and {m}sk for a message m
signed with the signing key sk. The equational theory contains
standard equations, for example pairing and projection obey
fst(〈p1, p2〉) = p1 and snd(〈p1, p2〉) = p2. We sometimes omit
the brackets 〈〉 when tupling is clear from the context.
We extend the term algebra from [4] with the following
function symbols and equations. We use ver(s, k) for signature
verification, where s is a signed message and k the verification
key. When the signature in s is verified with the (matching)
verification key k, the function returns the underlying signed
message m and otherwise it returns a default value ⊥. This
is modeled by the equations ver(s, k) = m, if s = {m}sk and
k = pk(sk), and ver(s, k) =⊥ otherwise.
Moreover, we use the function Tally to model the tallying
process in voting. Given a list of ballots [b], Tally([b]) denotes
the computation of the votes [v] in the final tally, possibly
including pre-processing steps such as filtering out invalid
ballots. The exact definition of Tally depends on the protocol.
Finally, castBy(b) denotes the voter who is considered to
be the sender of a ballot b. As with Tally, castBy(b) depends
on the protocol, in particular on the ballots’ design. For
example, in a voting protocol where a ballot b contains a
voter’s identifier (e.g., a code or pseudonym), castBy(b) maps
the ballot b to the voter with the identifier included in b. In
contrast, in a voting protocol where ballots contain a signature
associated with a voter, castBy(b) maps each ballot to the voter
associated with the signature contained in b.
As Tally and castBy are protocol dependent, each concrete
protocol specification must define the equations that they
satisfy, i.e., extend the term algebra’s equational theory with
equations characterizing their properties. Note that the func-
tions may not be publicly computable. For example, if only a
voter H knows which identifier or signature belongs to him,
then other parties are not able to conclude that castBy(b) = H .
B. Protocol specification
A protocol consists of multiple (role) specifications that
define the behavior of the different communicating roles.
We model protocols as transition systems that give rise to a
trace semantics. Each role specification defines the role’s sent
and received messages and signals that are recorded, ordered
sequentially. A signal is a term with a distinguished top-
most function symbol. Signals have no effect on a protocol’s
execution. They merely label events in executions to facilitate
specifying the protocol’s security properties. We distinguish
explicit signals that are defined in the specification and implicit
signals that are recorded during the protocol execution but are
not explicitly included in the specification. We explain how we
depict protocols as message sequence charts in Section VI-D2.
Roles may possess terms in their initial knowledge, which
is denoted by the explicit signal knows. We require that in a
specified role R, any message sent by R must either occur
in R’s initial knowledge or be deducible from the messages
that R initially knows or received in a previous protocol step.
Deducibility is defined by the equational theory introduced
above. As is standard, whenever R is specified to receive
a term that it already has in its knowledge, an agent who
instantiates this role will compare the two terms and proceed
with the protocol only when they are equal.
C. Adversary model and communication topology
We depict the system setup as a topology graph G = (V,E),
where the set of vertices V denotes the roles and the set
of (directed) edges E ⊆ (V × V ) describes the available
communication channels between roles (see e.g. Figure 1). For
two graphs G1 = (V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2), we define the
standard subgraph relation G1 ⊆G G2 as V1 ⊆ V2∧E1 ⊆ E2.
By default, we consider a Dolev-Yao adversary [19] who has
full control over the network, learns all messages sent over the
network, and can construct and send messages herself. Addi-
tionally, the adversary can compromise participating agents to
learn their secrets and control their behavior. In a concrete
system model, we limit the adversary by trust and channel
assumptions. A (communication) topology [4] T = (V,E, t, c)
specifies the system setup by a graph G(T ) = (V,E), trust
assumptions by a function t : V 7→ trustType mapping
vertices to trust types, and channel assumptions by a function
c : E 7→ chanType mapping edges to channel types, which
denote a channel with certain properties. The types trustType
and chanType are specified in Section II-E, after the execution
model. When c is applied to an edge (A,B), we omit duplicate
brackets and write c(A,B) instead of c((A,B)).
D. Execution model, signals, properties, and assumptions
During protocol execution, roles are instantiated by agents
(i.e., the parties involved in the protocol) and we consider
all possible interleavings of agents’ runs in parallel with the
adversary. A trace tr is a finite sequence of multisets of the
signals associated with an interleaved execution. We denote by
TR(Pr, T ) the set of all traces of a protocol Pr that is run in
the topology T , i.e., run in parallel with the adversary defined
by the topology T .2 We write tr1 · tr2 for the concatenation
of two traces tr1 and tr2.
As previously explained, a trace may contain implicit sig-
nals, which are recorded during execution but omitted from
the protocol specification for readability, and explicit signals
(containing auxiliary information) that we explicitly add to
the protocol specification. Implicitly, when an agent A sends
a message m (presumably) to B, the signal send(A,B,m) is
recorded in the trace. Similarly, when an agent B receives m
(presumably) from A, rec(A,B,m) is recorded. Furthermore,
the signal K(m) denotes the adversary’s knowledge and is
recorded whenever the adversary learns a term m and hon(A)
is recorded when an honest agent A instantiates a role.
Furthermore, we use the explicit signal verifyC(H, b) to
indicate that an honest agent checks whether the ballot b,
which was cast by the honest voter H , is recorded correctly
(C stands for cast and indicates that H cast a ballot). In
protocols where voters can cast multiple ballots, this signal
2T may specify channels that are never used by Pr. Also, Pr may specify
channels that are not available in T . In the latter case, the corresponding
protocol steps cannot be executed and will not occur in the execution.
can occur multiple times for the same voter. Moreover, the
signal verifyA(H, bH) is recorded when an honest agent checks
for an honest voter H who has cast the set of ballots bH , that
no ballots other than those in bH are recorded for H . When
this check is done for H who abstained, then bH = ∅ (A
stands for the fact that H abstained from voting). verifyC and
verifyA may be defined such that they can be computed by
a machine but not by a human voter, e.g., when they require
cryptographic computations. We thus leave it open whether
they are performed by the voter H or by another agent such
as a helper device.
The explicit signal knows(A, x) is recorded when an agent
A has a term x in its initial knowledge. The explicit signals
Vote(H, v) and Ballot(H, b) respectively record an honest
voter H’s vote v and cast ballot b. The former is recorded
when H decides what to vote for and the latter is recorded
when H casts his ballot. Finally, the explicit signal BB(m)
denotes that a message m is published on the bulletin board.
We use subscripts to distinguish the signals recorded when
different messages are published on the bulletin board. For
example, the signals BBrec([b]) and BBtal([v]) denote that the
recorded ballots [b] and the votes in the final tally [v] are
published. We will introduce further signals as we need them.
We next define two kinds of trace properties. The first are
classical security properties, which are specified as sets of
traces. A protocol Pr run in the topology T , satisfies a security
property SS , if TR(Pr, T ) ⊆ SS . To reason about functional
requirements, we additionally define functional properties. For
example, the empty protocol satisfies many security properties
but it is useless for voting because, even in the absence of
the adversary, a voter’s ballot is never recorded. We will thus
require a functional property stating that a protocol must at
least have one execution where a voter’s ballot is correctly
recorded. We describe a functional property by a set of traces
SF , for example containing all traces where a voter’s ballot is
recorded. We then define that a protocol Pr run in the topology
T satisfies the property SF if TR(Pr, T ) ∩ SF 6= ∅. Finally,
we define protocol assumptions as sets of traces. That is, we
define so-called (trace) restrictions by giving a set of traces
and then only consider the traces in the intersection of this set
and TR(Pr, T ) (see e.g. Section II-E2).
E. Trust and channel types
1) Trust types: In the topologies, we consider four types of
trust on roles that reflect the honesty of the agents that execute
the role. A trusted role means we assume that the agents
who instantiate this role are always honest and thus strictly
follow their role specification. In contrast, an untrusted role
can be instantiated by dishonest agents (i.e., compromised by
the adversary) who behave arbitrarily. Dishonest agents model
both corrupt entities and entities that unintentionally deviate
from their specification, for example due to software errors.
We model dishonest agents by sending all their secrets to the
adversary and by modeling all their incoming and outgoing
channels as insecure (see the channel types below).
In addition, we consider the types trustFwd and trustRpl,
which assume partial trust. The agents who instantiate a
role of type trustFwd or trustRpl do not strictly follow their
role specification but, respectively, always correctly forward
messages or reply upon receiving correct messages. Such
assumptions turn out to often be necessary for the timeliness
property that we introduce shortly, as otherwise dishonest
agents that are expected to forward or answer certain messages
can fail to do so and thereby block other protocol participants.
Thus, these trust types enable fine grained distinctions to
be made about which assumptions are necessary for certain
properties to hold.
In summary, we consider the set of trust types trustType :=
{trusted, trustFwd, trustRpl, untrusted}. In the topologies, we
denote trusted roles by nodes that are circled twice (see e.g.,
BB in Figure 3a, p. 11) and the partial trust types trustFwd and
trustRpl by two dashed circles (see e.g., P in Figure 3a). In
our protocol class, there is no role that can be mapped both to
type trustFwd and to type trustRpl; thus the interpretation will
always be unambiguous. All remaining roles are untrusted.
2) Channel types: In addition to the trust assumptions, a
communication topology states channel assumptions. Chan-
nels, which are the edges in the topology graph, denote which
parties can communicate with each other. Also, channels
define assumptions, for example that limit the adversary by
stating who can change or learn the messages sent over a
given channel. Following Maurer and Schmid [29], we use
the notation A ◦−→◦ B, A •−→◦ B, A ◦−→• B, and A •−→• B
to denote a channel from (instances of) role A to role B that is
respectively insecure, authentic, confidential, and secure. For
a formal semantics for these channels, see [4].
We introduce two additional channel assumptions that are
useful for dispute resolution. These assumptions concern
whether a channel reliably delivers messages and whether
external observers can see the communication on a channel.
Usually, it is assumed that the above channels are unreliable
in that the adversary can drop messages sent. We make such
assumptions explicit and also allow for reliable variants of
channels. On a reliable channel, the adversary cannot drop
messages and thus all messages sent are received by the
intended recipient. We will see in Section V that such channels
are needed to achieve timeliness properties.
For dispute resolution, it is sometimes required that external
observers can witness the communication an agent is involved
in to later judge whether this agent is telling the truth. For
example, it may be required that witnesses can observe when
a voter casts his physical ballot by placing it into a voting
box. Such communication cannot later be denied, e.g. when
others witness that the voter has cast his ballot then the voter
cannot later deny this. Whereas it is in reality sufficient if
several witnesses, e.g., a subset of all voters, can observe such
communication, we model this by channels that specify that
any honest agent can observe such communication. Similarly,
we will also model the fact that sufficiently many parties can
decide who is right in a dispute by specifying that any party
can resolve disputes (see Section IV). Concretely, we model
communication that can be observed by others by undeniable
channels where any honest agent C /∈ {A,B} learns the
communication between A and B. This is in contrast to the
default deniable channels, where an honest agent C /∈ {A,B}
cannot determine that A and B are communicating with each
other.
A channel type can be built from any combination of the
three channel assumptions introduced above. For example,
on an insecure reliable channel, the adversary can learn all
messages and write messages herself, but she cannot drop
messages sent from A to B. However, for dispute resolution
not all combinations are useful. In particular, an undeniable
channel provides evidence that a message was sent, but this is
only useful together with the guarantee that the message is also
received. Hence, we only consider undeniable channels that
are also reliable. We thus distinguish the following channel
types, named after their most significant property: The default
channels ◦ d−→◦, • d−→◦, ◦ d−→•, • d−→•, which are neither reliable
nor undeniable, the reliable channels ◦ r−→◦, • r−→◦, ◦ r−→•, • r−→•,
which are reliable but not undeniable, and the undeniable
channels ◦ u−→◦, • u−→◦, ◦ u−→•, • u−→•, which are both reliable and
undeniable.
We model the guarantees for senders and receivers that use
a reliable or undeniable channel by stating that each message
sent on such a channel is also received. We only require this
property when both the sender and the receiver of a message
are trusted or partially trusted and formally express it by the
following restriction.
{tr |∀A,B,m. t(A), t(B) ∈ {trusted, trustFwd, trustRpl}
∧ c(A,B) ∈ {◦ r−→◦, • r−→◦, ◦ r−→•, • r−→•, ◦ u−→◦, • u−→◦, ◦ u−→•, • u−→•}
∧ send(A,B,m) ∈ tr =⇒ rec(A,B,m) ∈ tr}.
To model the additional guarantee that undeniable channels
provide, additional signals are recorded in the trace when
agents communicate over such channels. That is, whenever an
agent A sends a message m to B over an undeniable channel,
in addition to the signals send(A,B,m) and rec(A,B,m),
the signal Pub(A,B,m) is recorded. We formalize this by the
following restriction.
{tr |∀A,B,m. c(A,B) ∈ {◦ u−→◦, • u−→◦, ◦ u−→•, • u−→•}∧
(send(A,B,m) ∈ tr ∨ rec(A,B,m) ∈ tr)
=⇒ Pub(A,B,m) ∈ tr}.
In the rest of this paper, these two restrictions are always
stipulated. That is, whenever we use TR(Pr, T ) to refer to all
traces of the protocol Pr run in the topology T , we actually
mean all traces in the intersection of TR(Pr, T ) and the above
two sets of trace restrictions.
III. CLASS OF VOTING PROTOCOLS
Formal reasoning about dispute resolution in voting requires
a language for specifying voting protocols and their properties.
We provide such a language by presenting a class of voting
protocols for which we subsequently define dispute resolution
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Fig. 1: The topology graphs GS (left) and GU (right). We
allow for any topology where G(T ) ⊆G GS or G(T ) ⊆G GU .
properties. Our class comprises both remote and poll-site vot-
ing protocols that can be electronic or paper-based. However,
we require a public bulletin board, which is, most of the time,
realized by digital means. We define the class by stating natural
restrictions that communication topologies and protocols must
satisfy to be in our class. Afterwards, we show that many
well-known voting protocols belong to this class.
A. Communication topologies considered
1) Topology graph: The topology graphs in Figure 1 depict
all possible roles and communication channels that we con-
sider. That is, we allow for any topology T whose G(T ) is
a subgraph of GS or GU in Figure 1. The node H describes
two roles for the human voters, one for voters who vote and
one for those voters who abstain. Also, there are roles for the
devices D and P, the voting authority Auth, a public bulletin
board BB, and the auditor A. In a concrete protocol, each role,
except for Auth and BB, can be instantiated by multiple agents.
We consider two kinds of setups, GS and GU in Figure 1,
for two kinds of protocols that differ in how ballots are cast.
GS provides the necessary channels for protocols where each
voter H knows his ballot and sends it to Auth using a platform
P. It models remote and poll-site voting. In the former case
P could be the voter’s personal computer, and in the latter
case P could be a ballot box, or an optical scanner that
forwards H’s ballot b to the authority for tallying. GU models
setups for protocols where a trusted platform P computes (e.g.,
encrypts) and casts the ballot for H . Often, such protocols do
not distinguish between H and P and P operates “in the name
of H”. Therefore, we model the setup of such protocols by
unifying the roles H and P into a single role voter H .
In some protocols, voters also have a personal off-line
device D. In contrast to P, D has limited capabilities and is not
connected to the authority. This models, for example, off-line
trusted digital devices or letters containing codes that may be
used to compute ballots.
Auth denotes the authority that is responsible for setting up
elections and collecting and tallying the ballots. Even though
some voting protocols describe the authority in terms of
several distinct roles, we collectively describe all these relevant
functionalities in a single role, except for the publication of
information, which is described by the bulletin board role
BB. We then also consider just one agent in the role Auth.
We will argue in Section IV that this is sufficient for our
dispute resolution properties. As depicted in Figure 1, Auth can
publish information on BB, which can be read by the auditors
and voters. An auditor performs checks on the published
information to ensure that the election proceeded correctly.
By modeling the auditor as a separate role, this role can be
instantiated by anyone, including the voters.
2) Topology assumptions: We further restrict the considered
communication topologies by making some minimal channel
and trust assumptions. As is common for many voting proto-
cols [5], [15], [16], [21], we model a secure bulletin board
and consider its realization as a separate problem. Such a
bulletin board can be used to send messages authentically and
consistently from the authority to all voters and auditors. We
thus assume that the roles BB and A exist and are trusted and
that the channels from Auth to BB as well as from BB to H
and A exist and are default authentic channels. Furthermore,
we only use the following partial trust assumptions. Auth can
be trusted to always reply with a confirmation upon receiving
a correct message (type trustRpl) and P can be trusted to
always forward messages correctly (type trustFwd), e.g., a
voting machine can be trusted to forward the entered ballots
to a remote server. The remaining channel and trust types
can respectively be assigned to any channels and roles. Note
that we support protocols using anonymous channels (e.g.
Civitas [15]) since, for the properties we consider, anonymous
channels can be modeled as our default channels.3
For dispute resolution, certain guarantees should hold for
an honest voter H , even with an untrusted or partially trusted
authority and even if all other voters are untrusted. Similarly,
the guarantees for the honest authority should hold even when
all voters are untrusted. We therefore only consider topologies
T where the roles H and Auth are untrusted or partially trusted
and analyze dispute resolution with respect to three variations
of T . We introduce the following notation. We single out a
distinguished voter H for whom the security properties are
analyzed. Given a topology T , T Auth
+H+ denotes the same
topology but where the trust assumptions about Auth and the
distinguished H are defined by t(Auth) = trusted and t(H) =
trusted, T Auth
+
is as T but with t(Auth) = trusted, and TH
+
is
as T but with t(H) = trusted. Note that in all variations, the
trust assumptions about the voters other than H are as in T .
B. Voting protocols considered
We next define the voting protocols considered in terms of
the protocols’ structure and which equations must be speci-
fied in the term algebra. Our definition allows for protocols
with re-voting, that is, where voters can send several ballots
(e.g., [15]). As explained in Section III-A, we allow protocols
where the voter H knows and casts his ballot or where a
trusted platform P casts the ballot, in which case we unify
the roles H and P .
1) Required functions and equations: A protocol specifica-
tion must define the equation satisfied by Tally([b]), defining
how the election’s result is computed from the list of recorded
ballots [b]. Similarly, a protocol must define the equation
satisfied by castBy(b), which must map each ballot b to a
3Distinguishing between anonymous and default channels is relevant when
analyzing observational equivalence properties such as coercion resistance.
However, for our possibility results, we only consider reachability properties.
voter, thereby specifying that this voter is considered to have
cast the ballot.
2) Protocol’s start and end: We assume that the protocol’s
setup can specify any number of voters and devices and any
relation between them, for example that each voter is associ-
ated with a unique trusted device. Also, at the protocol’s start
some public information may be posted on the bulletin board.
For example, this might be some election parameters or the
list of all eligible voters, denoted by BBH([H]). Furthermore,
some agents may know some terms such that these terms (or
associated terms) are initially published on the bulletin board
or known to other agents. For example, Auth’s public key
pkAuth := pk(skAuth) can be posted on the bulletin board at the
protocol’s start whereby Auth has the corresponding private
key skAuth in its initial knowledge. We require, however, that
at the protocol’s start no honest agent knows a voter H’s ballot
other than the voter himself.
We also assume that an election has two publicly known
deadlines that determine the voting phase’s end, i.e., when
ballots can no longer be cast, and the moment when all relevant
information is published. We denote the latter by the explicit
signal End in the BB role, which is recorded right after the
last message relevant for the election is published.
3) Tallying and publication of results: We assume that
ballots are collected and tallied by the authority Auth and that
the protocol allows voters to abstain from voting. Thus, Auth
starts the tallying process after the voting phase, even if not
all voters have cast a ballot. By the election’s end, all valid
ballots that were received by the authority have been published
on the bulletin board together with the votes in the final tally.
In protocols with re-voting, all ballots are published in the
list of recorded ballots and the tallying process is responsible
for removing duplicates. Finally, we assume that all messages
sent to the bulletin board are immediately published. That
is, whenever BB receives a message m, the signal BB(m) is
recorded in the trace.
C. Examples of protocols in our voting class
Our class comprises well known voting protocols such as
Helios [1], Belenios [16], and Civitas [15]. In these protocols,
voters can abstain from voting, the bulletin board is assumed
to be secure, and the recorded ballots are published on the
bulletin board as they were received by the authority. More-
over, even though these protocols all specify different roles
and setups, they can each be understood as instantiations of
the setups in Figure 1. Belenios and Civitas both have many
authority roles, such as registrars and different trustees, which
can be understood as our role Auth. In Belenios, the Bulletin
Board also performs some checks and computations. Thus, to
cast it in our protocol class, we must additionally interpret
those parts of Belenios’s Bulletin Board as part of our role
Auth and just the published part of Belenios’s Bulletin Board
as our role bulletin board BB.
Note that there are voting protocols, such as Bele-
niosRF [13], where the recorded ballots are re-encrypted be-
fore being published on the bulletin board to achieve stronger
privacy properties. Such protocols are not in our class.
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In voting, the authority conducting the election should
behave as expected. That is, if the authority is dishonest, it
must be held accountable for this. For elections that are con-
ducted by multiple parties, we require that it is unambiguously
detectable when any of these parties misbehave, but we do not
require that it is detectable which of these parties misbehave.
This is sufficient to determine when “the system” running the
election does not proceed as expected and to take recovery
measures when this is the case, such as declaring the election
to be invalid. Thus, except for the bulletin board, we model
all of the parties involved in conducting an election as one
role (and agent) authority Auth and require that this agent is
held accountable if it does not behave as expected, i.e. does
not follow its role specification.
In contrast to the authority, we should not and cannot require
that all other parties, notably the voters, behave as expected.
In fact, a well-designed voting protocol should still satisfy its
expected properties for the honest voters, even when other
voters misbehave. We therefore only consider disputes with
respect to claims that the voting authority is dishonest.
We first explain why dispute resolution is needed in elec-
tions and characterize all relevant disputes. Afterwards, to
formalize our dispute resolution properties, we extend our
protocol model with additional signals and functions. We then
motivate the required properties using our classification and
formalize them using the model extensions.
A. Relevant disputes
After an election, all honest participants should agree on
the election’s outcome. A protocol where any manipulation
by the authority can be detected by suitable checks is called
verifiable. For voting, the gold standard is end-to-end veri-
fiability where the final tally consists of the honest voters’
votes, tallied correctly and this can all be checked. Often, this
property is divided into universal and individual verifiability.
Universal verifiability properties denote that some guarantees
hold (e.g., the tally is computed correctly) if an auditor
performs appropriate checks on bulletin-board data. Any voter
or independent third party can serve as an auditor and do such
checks. Therefore, if the universal verifiability checks fail, all
honest protocol participants will agree on this fact and such
checks never give rise to disputes.
Individual verifiability denotes that each voter can verify
that his own ballot has been correctly considered in the list of
recorded ballots. As only the voter knows which ballot he has
cast, this property relies on checks that must (and can only)
be done by each voter himself. Hence, individual verifiability
checks give rise to the following three problems, where a
voter claims that the authority is dishonest while other protocol
participants cannot determine whether the voter is lying.
(1) A voter is hindered from taking the protocol step where
he casts his ballot, in particular he cannot complete one of the
preceding protocols steps. There may be technical as well as
social reasons for this. For example, the voter may fail to be
provided with the necessary credentials in a setup phase or he
cannot access a polling station. For generality, we therefore
consider disputes regarding the inability to cast a ballot as out
of scope of this paper and focus in the following on disputes
concerning whether the recorded ballots correctly reflect the
ballots cast by the voters.
(2) A voter who successfully cast his ballot is hindered from
reaching the verifiability step. For instance, this can happen
when recording a ballot requires receiving a confirmation from
the authority, which is sent to the voter too late or not at all.
(3) A voter’s check whether his ballot is recorded correctly
fails. This can happen when a voter detects that one of his cast
ballots was not recorded correctly or when he detects that there
is a ballot recorded for him that he never sent.
As a result of the above reasoning, based on (3) we
distinguish two possible disputes that must be considered in
voting protocols, which are depicted in Figure 2. In both
disputes, a voter H’s and the authority’s claim about H’s cast
ballot differ, where the authority’s claim is denoted by the
information on the bulletin board. We take the standpoint that
the authority is responsible for setting up a working channel
to the bulletin board. That is, if messages are not on the
bulletin board that should be there, we consider this to be
the authority’s fault. In the dispute D1, a voter H claims that
he cast a ballot b, while the authority Auth claims that H did
not cast b and in the dispute D2 their claims are reversed.
Note that when H claims to have cast b and Auth claims that
H cast b′, this constitutes both a dispute D1 with respect to
the ballot b and a dispute D2 with respect to b′.
We require that when a voter learns that the authority Auth
did not record a ballot that he cast, he can convince the other
honest participants that Auth is dishonest. This is a prerequisite
needed to take recovery measures when such manipulations
occur. The same must hold when a voter learns that Auth
recorded a ballot for him that he did not cast. We respectively
denote these properties by VoterC(Auth) (in dispute D1) and
VoterA(Auth) (in dispute D2).
As explained in (2), it is also a problem when a voter who
casts a ballot is hindered from reaching his verifiability check
in due time. We thus require that a voter who casts a ballot
has some timeliness guarantees, namely that by the election’s
end either his ballot is correctly recorded or he has evidence
to convince others that the authority Auth is dishonest. We
denote this property by TimelyP(Auth).
Finally, it is possible that voters lie. Therefore, we require
that an honest authority Auth is protected from false convic-
tions in any dispute. We denote this by AuthP(Auth).
Some protocols support re-voting, where voters can send a
set of ballots, all of which are recorded on the bulletin board.
In this case, the dispute D1 denotes that H claims that at least
one of his cast ballots is not listed by Auth. We thus require
that VoterC(Auth) and TimelyP(Auth) hold for each cast ballot.
Dispute D2 means that H claims not to have cast some of
the ballots that are recorded for him. In such a dispute, the
Voter H claims that H Authority Auth claims that H Properties protecting H Properties protecting Auth
D1 cast ballot b did not cast ballot b VoterC(Auth), TimelyP(Auth) AuthP(Auth)
D2 did not cast ballot b cast ballot b VoterA(Auth) AuthP(Auth)
Fig. 2: Possible disputes in voting. The authority’s claim is captured by the information on the bulletin board. The respective
disputes can be resolved when all properties in the third and fourth columns hold.
voter must be able to convince everyone that too many ballots
are recorded for him and that the authority Auth is dishonest.
This guarantee generalizes the property VoterA(Auth), which
we will define so that it covers both situations. As before, the
disputes D1 and D2 can occur simultaneously, for example
when H claims he cast the ballots b1 and b2 and Auth claims
that H cast b2 and b3.
B. Protocol model for dispute resolution
To formalize dispute resolution for our class of voting
protocols, we extend our protocol model from Section II.
It may be required that agents collect evidence to be used
in disputes. We use the signal Ev(b, ev) to model that the
evidence ev concerning the ballot b is collected. We model
the forgery of such evidence by allowing any dishonest agent
to claim that any term in its knowledge is evidence. That is, we
allow the adversary to perform an action that records Ev(b, ev)
for any terms b and ev such that K(〈b, ev〉).
As we have argued that all honest agents should be able to
agree on the outcome of disputes, we do not specify which
agents resolve disputes and how the collected evidence must
be communicated to them to file disputes. We merely define
that a voting protocol can generate evidence such that any
third party who obtains this evidence can, together with public
information, judge whether the authority Auth is dishonest.
Recall that in poll-site settings, undeniable channels are used
to model that sufficiently many witnesses can observe the
relevant communication in practice. In this context, requir-
ing that any third party can judge whether the authority is
dishonest models that sufficiently many parties can decide
this in practice. Abstracting away from these details allows
us to focus on which evidence and observations are required
to resolve disputes, independently of how undeniable channels
are realized in practice.
We thus model the verdict of whether Auth should be
considered dishonest by a publicly verifiable property Faulty,
which can be specified as part of each voting protocol,
independently of any role. Faulty(Auth, b) defines a set of
traces where the agent Auth is considered to have behaved dis-
honestly with respect to the ballot b, i.e., b has presumably not
been processed according to the protocol in these traces. For
example, Faulty(Auth, b) := {tr |∃B, [b]. Pub(Auth, B, b) ∧
BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b /∈ [b]} specifies that Auth is considered
dishonest in all traces where the ballot b was sent from Auth
to an agent B on an undeniable channel but not included in
the recorded ballots [b] published on the bulletin board.
To ensure that the verdict whether a trace is in the set
Faulty(Auth, b) is publicly verifiable, the specification of
Faulty(Auth, b) must depend just on evidence and public
information. We thus state the following requirement.
Requirement 1. Faulty(Auth, b) may only be defined based on
the signals BB, Ev, and Pub.
Whereas the above example satisfies this requirement, the set
{tr |∃A,B,m, [b]. send(A,B,m) ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧m /∈ [b]}
is not a valid definition of Faulty(Auth, b), as send is not one
of the admissible signals.
As a consequence of the above requirement, not all signals
in a trace tr are relevant for evaluating whether tr satisfies
a given Faulty definition. In particular, let pubtr(tr) be a
projection that maps a trace tr to the signals in tr whose
top-most function symbol is one of BB, Ev, or Pub, while
maintaining the order of these signals. Then, it follows from
Requirement 1 that for all traces tr1 and tr2 such that
pubtr(tr1) = pubtr(tr2), it holds that tr1 ∈ Faulty(Auth, b)
iff tr2 ∈ Faulty(Auth, b).
C. Formal dispute resolution properties
We now use our extended model to define the dispute
resolution properties for our class of voting protocols. We
formalize each property from Figure 2 as a set of traces.
First, we consider the property VoterC(Auth) that protects
an honest voter who detects that one of his cast ballots is not
recorded correctly by the authority Auth. Intuitively, we require
that if this happens, the voter can then convince others that
the authority is dishonest. Specifically, the property states that
whenever an honest voter H (or one of his devices) reaches
the step where he believes that one of his ballots b should be
recorded on BB, then either this ballot is correctly included in
the list of recorded ballots on BB or everyone can conclude
that the authority Auth is dishonest. We define VoterC(Auth)
as follows (C denotes that a ballot has been cast).
Definition 1.
VoterC(Auth) := {tr | verifyC(H, b) ∈ tr
=⇒ (∃[b]. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b ∈ [b]) ∨ tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b)}.
Note that, for notational simplicity, here and in the rest
of the paper, when using set comprehension notation like
{x|F (x, ȳ)}, all free variables ȳ different from x are univer-
sally quantified, i.e., {x|∀ȳ. F (x, ȳ)}.
The next property, TimelyP(Auth), states that an honest voter
H who casts a ballot b cannot be prevented from proceeding
in the protocol such that his ballot is recorded or, if he is
prevented, then he can convince others that the authority Auth
is dishonest. In particular, a voter’s ballot must be recorded
or there must exist evidence that the authority is dishonest
within a useful time period. Note that we do not require that
the resolution of disputes must take place before the election’s
end and there can be a complaint period afterwards. However,
we require that the necessary evidence exists by this fixed
deadline as otherwise it could be received after the complaint
period ended. We now define TimelyP(Auth).
Definition 2.
TimelyP(Auth) := {tr | ∃tr ′, tr ′′. tr = tr ′· tr ′′
∧Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′ ∧ End ∈ tr ′′
=⇒ (∃[b].BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ′ ∧ b ∈ [b]) ∨ tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b)}.
The difference to VoterC(Auth) (Definition 1) is that we not
only require the property when a verifiability check is reached,
but whenever all the relevant information is published on the
bulletin board (indicated by End) and a voter’s ballot was
cast before this deadline. We illustrate this difference on an
example in Section VI-D3.
For abstaining voters we define VoterA(Auth). It states that
when an honest voter H who abstains from voting, or one
of H’s devices, checks that no ballot is recorded for H , then
either this is the case or everyone can be convinced that the
authority Auth is dishonest. We define this property such that it
can also be used in protocols with re-voting, where a voter who
cast a set of ballots bH checks that no additional ballots are
wrongly recorded for him. We define VoterA(Auth) as follows.
Definition 3.
VoterA(Auth) := {tr | verifyA(H, bH) ∈ tr
=⇒ ¬(∃[b], b. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b ∈ [b] ∧ castBy(b) = H
∧ b /∈ bH) ∨ ∃b. tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b)}.
Note that castBy is just a claim that H has cast a ballot and
does not imply that H has actually cast it. For example, in a
protocol where ballots contain a voter’s identity in plain text
and castBy(b) is defined to map each ballot to the voter whose
identity it contains, everyone can construct a ballot b such that
H = castBy(b), even when H has not cast it.
It is possible, of course, that a voter who claims that the
authority is dishonest is lying. Thus, for dispute resolution
to be fair, it must not only protect the honest voters but
also an honest authority. We formalize by AuthP(Auth) that
traces where the authority Auth is honest should not be in
Faulty(Auth, b) for any ballot b.
Definition 4.
AuthP(Auth) := {tr | hon(Auth) ∈ tr
=⇒ ∀b. tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b)}.
Even though the above properties are stated independently
of any adversary model, VoterC(Auth), TimelyP(Auth), and
VoterA(Auth) are guarantees for an honest voter H and must
hold even when the authority Auth and other voters are dis-
honest. Similarly, AuthP(Auth) constitutes a guarantee for Auth
and must hold even if all voters are dishonest. Therefore, we
define a dispute resolution property by stating what property
must be satisfied by a protocol (1) for the honest voter H , i.e.,
when the protocol is run in a topology where H is honest, and
(2) for the honest authority Auth. Additionally, it is usually
required that a protocol satisfies some functional requirement
when the agents are honest. Thus a dispute resolution property
also specifies (3) which functional requirement must hold
when both Auth and the voter H are honest.
Definition 5. Let pH and pAuth be two security properties that
must hold respectively for an honest voter H and the honest
authority Auth and let pf be a functional property that must
hold when both agents are honest. A protocol Pr, executed
in a topology T , satisfies the dispute resolution property
DR(Pr, T, pH , pAuth, pf ) iff
TR(Pr, T Auth
+H+) ⊆ pH ∩ pAuth ∧ TR(Pr, TH
+
) ⊆ pH
∧TR(Pr, T Auth+) ⊆ pAuth ∧ TR(Pr, T Auth
+H+) ∩ pf 6= ∅.
For example, DR(Pr, T,VoterC(Auth) ∩ TimelyP(Auth) ∩
VoterA(Auth),AuthP(Auth), f) denotes that the protocol Pr
run in the topology T satisfies all previously introduced
properties in the required adversary models. That is, it satisfies
the properties VoterC(Auth), TimelyP(Auth), and VoterA(Auth)
for an honest voter H , the property AuthP(Auth) for an
honest authority Auth, and the functional property f for an
honest voter and the honest authority (see the next section
for an example of a functional property). Another dispute
resolution property that we consider in the next Section is
DR(Pr, T,TimelyP(Auth),AuthP(Auth), f), which states that
the timeliness property TimelyP(Auth) should hold for an
honest voter H while AuthP(Auth) is preserved for the honest
authority Auth.
V. COMMUNICATION TOPOLOGIES AND TIMELINESS
For TimelyP(Auth), it is a problem when messages are
lost as some protocol participants may be waiting for these
messages and thus cannot proceed in the protocol. Intuitively,
timeliness only holds under strong assumptions. We investigate
this next by systematically characterizing the assumptions
needed for TimelyP(Auth) to hold in our protocol class.
A. Problem scope
1) Dispute resolution property: We aim at achieving time-
liness guarantees for the voters while also maintaining the
AuthP(Auth) property for the authority Auth. Furthermore, we
are only interested in protocols where a voter’s ballot can
actually be recorded. To express the third requirement, we
formalize a functional property stating that for a given protocol
and topology, there must be an execution where an honest
voter H casts a ballot b and where this ballot is published
in the list of recorded ballots [b] on the bulletin board before
the last relevant information is published (indicated by End).
Moreover, this property must hold when all agents and the
network behave honestly. We denote by honestNetw the set of
traces where all agents follow the protocol and messages are
forwarded on all channels unchanged. The required functional
property is defined as the following set of traces.
Definition 6.
Func := {tr | ∃tr ′, tr ′′,H, b, [b]. tr = tr ′· tr ′′∧
Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′ ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ′ ∧ b ∈ [b] ∧ End ∈ tr ′′
∧ tr ∈ honestNetw}.
Given a protocol Pr and a topology T ,
we would like the dispute resolution property
DR(Pr, T, TimelyP(Auth), AuthP(Auth),Func), which we
write for conciseness as TimelyDR(Pr, T ).
2) Additional assumptions: In standard protocol models,
honest agents can stop executing their role at any time. For
timeliness, this might be a problem as other agents may wait
for their messages and cannot proceed in the protocol. We thus
state the additional assumption that honest agents do not abort
the protocol execution prematurely. Similarly, we assume that
partially trusted agents execute the required action once they
can. Note that agents can still be blocked, e.g., when waiting
for messages that are dropped on the network.
Assumption 1. Honest agents always execute all protocol steps
possible and agents who instantiate a role that is trusted to
forward or answer messages, i.e., partially trusted, perform
this respective action once they can.
The assumption implies, for example, that when a role speci-
fies a send event after a receive event, the agent instantiating
the role will always perform the second step right after the
first one. However, an agent can also be blocked between two
consecutive protocol steps, for example when multiple receive
events are specified after each other and the agent must wait
for all of them.
Under the above assumption, we characterize all topologies
from our protocol class for which there exists a protocol that
satisfies TimelyDR, i.e., the set {T |∃Pr. TimelyDR(Pr, T )}.
As others [4], we introduce a partial order on topologies such
that a possibility result (i.e., the existence of a protocol such
that TimelyDR(Pr, T ) holds) for a weaker topology implies a
possibility result for a stronger topology. We then characterize
the above set by providing the “boundary” topologies, i.e., the
minimal topologies satisfying TimelyDR.
B. Communication topology hierarchy
We define a partial order on topologies that, given two
topologies, orders them with respect to their trust and system
assumptions. We first define a partial order on our trust and
channel types. For t, t′ ∈ trustType, t′ v t denotes that t is a
stronger assumption than t′. We thus have that untrusted v
trustFwd v trusted and untrusted v trustRpl v trusted.
We also define for two channel types c and c′ that c makes
stronger assumptions than c′. Formally, let v0 be the relation
where ◦ x−→◦v0◦ x−→•v0• x−→• and ◦ x−→◦v0• x−→◦v0• x−→• for all
x ∈ {d, r, u} and d−→v0 r−→v0 u−→ for all −→∈ {◦−→◦, •−→◦, ◦−→•
, •−→•}. We overload the symbol v and, for channel types, we
write v=v∗0, i.e., v is the reflexive transitive closure of v0.
Using the above, for two topologies T1 = (V1, E1, t1, c1)
and T2 = (V2, E2, t2, c2) we say that T2 makes at least
as strong assumptions as T1 if T2 uses channel and trust
assumptions that are at least as strong as those in T1 and if
T2’s topology graph includes all the roles and communication
channels that exist in T1:
T1 v T2 := G(T1) ⊆G G(T2) ∧ ∀(va, vb) ∈ E1.
c1(va, vb) v c2(va, vb) ∧ ∀v ∈ V1. t1(v) v t2(v).
We show next that defining the relation this way is useful for
relating possibility results for different topologies. In particu-
lar, if for a topology T it is possible to satisfy TimelyDR(Pr, T )
with some protocol, then for all topologies that make stronger
assumptions, there is also a protocol that satisfies the property.
The lemma is proven in Appendix A1 of the full version of
the paper [6].
Lemma 1. Let TI v TS be topologies in our class.
∃Pr. TimelyDR(Pr, TI) =⇒ ∃Pr′. TimelyDR(Pr′, TS).
C. Characterization of topologies enabling TimelyDR
We next present the minimal topologies satisfying TimelyDR
in our voting protocol class. In combination with the above
hierarchy, this allows us to fully characterize all topologies T
that enable TimelyDR(T,Pr) for some protocol Pr.
The minimal topologies are depicted in Figure 3 and de-
noted by T1, . . . , T7. Recall that the agents BB and A as
well as their incoming and outgoing channels have fixed trust
assumptions. In all topologies, there are roles for H, P and
Auth (respectively for H and Auth in T6 and T7), as this
is required to satisfy the functional property (H must cast
a ballot, P must forward it, and Auth must publish it on
BB). All topologies have a reliable path from H to Auth and
additional trust assumptions, such as (partially) trusted roles
or undeniable channels. We present some possible real-world
interpretations of these topologies in Section VI-A.
We now state the main theorem for our voting protocol
class: The set of topologies for which there exists a protocol
that establishes TimelyDR consists of all topologies that make
at least the assumptions that are made by one of the seven
topologies in Figure 3.
Theorem 1. Let T1, . . . , T7 be the topologies depicted in
Figure 3 and T be a topology in our voting protocol class.
(∃Pr. TimelyDR(Pr, T ))⇔ (∃i ∈ {1, . . . , 7}. Ti v T ).
We only explain the high level idea of the proof here and
refer to [6, Appendix A2] for the details.
Proof Sketch. First, we establish necessary requirements for
topologies to enable TimelyDR, by showing by pen-and-paper
proofs that any topologies that do not meet these requirements
cannot satisfy TimelyDR with any protocol. Next, we show
that these requirements, which are met by the topologies
T1, . . . , T7 in Figure 3 are sufficient. In particular, we prove by
automated proofs in Tamarin (see [33]) that for each topology
Ti ∈ {T1, . . . , T7} there exists a simple protocol Pri for
which TimelyDR(Ti,Pri). Finally, we show (by hand) that
the topologies T1, . . . , T7 in Figure 3 are the only minimal
topologies satisfying the necessary and sufficient requirements.
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Fig. 3: The minimal topologies for which there exists a protocol such that TimelyDR can be achieved. The channels’ labels
denote whether the channels are default (d), reliable (r), or undeniable (u). The nodes’ lines denote whether the roles are
untrusted (circled once), trusted (circled twice), or partially trusted (dashed circles), where a partially trusted P is of type
trustFwd and a partially trusted Auth is of type trustRpl.
It follows that all topologies in our class are either stronger
than one of the topologies T1, . . . , T7 and, by Lemma 1, also
also establish TimelyDR with some protocol or they are weaker
than one of the topologies T1, . . . , T7 and thus do not meet
the necessary requirements for TimelyDR.
The theorem shows that strong assumptions are indeed
necessary to achieve timeliness for dispute resolution. In
particular, unreliable channels are insufficient. In most cases,
undeniable channels or trusted platforms are required. This can
only be avoided in those topologies where there are reliable
paths both from the voters to the authority and back. Moreover,
TimelyDR cannot hold when the platforms are untrusted. This
generalizes [2], which states that dispute resolution (called
contestability in [2]) cannot hold in poll-site voting protocols
where ballot-marking devices can be corrupted.
Recall that, in our protocol class, we also allow for off-
line devices D. Our analysis shows that D is irrelevant for
the question of whether or not TimelyDR can be achieved.
Also, it is irrelevant whether the channels between the voters
and the authority are authentic, confidential, or secure. In
particular, they can all be insecure. Nevertheless such devices
and channels are needed in voting to satisfy other properties,
for example privacy.
VI. DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN PRACTICE
We now give a practical interpretation of the above results
and illustrate how our formalism can be used.
A. Topologies providing TimelyDR
Consider the topologies T1, . . . , T7 in Figure 3. In T1, there
is an undeniable channel from P to Auth. When the platforms
are physical ballot boxes, this can be interpreted as the
assumption that sufficiently many witnesses see all ballots in
the boxes and observe that they are forwarded and considered
in the tallying process. The undeniable channel between H
and P in T2 could, for example, model that witnesses at each
polling station observe voters’ attempts to cast their ballot,
e.g., by scanning their already encrypted ballot on a voting
machine [31]. The trusted P in T3 models, for example, that
everyone trusts the voting machines used to compute and cast
ballots. In this case, the machines can store a trustworthy
record of what ballots have been cast for dispute resolution.
In topology T4, the paths from H to Auth as well as from
Auth to H are reliable. P and Auth are respectively trusted to
forward and reply. In a remote setting, the reliable channel
from H to P could model that voters can always successfully
enter messages on their platforms, for example on a working
keyboard. The voters could try with several platforms [37]
to cast their ballot remotely and receive a confirmation from
Auth or, in the worst case, go to a physical polling station
to do so. The assumptions then model that the voters can
find a working platform and website (e.g., public platforms in
libraries, polling places, etc.) or they can find a polling station
that issues them with a valid confirmation before the election
closes. In T5 and T6, the undeniable channels could model a
distributed ledger on which everyone can respectively observe
when confirmations are issued or ballots are cast. Finally, T7
could model a remote setting similar to T4, but where ballots
are cast by the trusted platforms.
B. Resolving dispute D2 in protocols without re-voting
In practice, the properties VoterC(Auth) and TimelyP(Auth)
can be established in a protocol that provides evidence that
a ballot was received by Auth. For example, this can be
achieved by an undeniable channel or by a confirmation that
is sent back from Auth to the voter upon a ballot’s receipt.
Faulty(Auth, b) can then be defined as the set of traces where
a ballot b was received by Auth but is not in the set of recorded
ballots on the bulletin board (see Section VI-D for a concrete
example). In contrast, it is often unclear how VoterA(Auth)
can be established as a voter who abstains cannot prove the
absence of a message. To solve this issue, we show that
VoterA(Auth) is, in many cases, entailed by the Uniqueness
property, defined next, that can be achieved using standard
techniques. We prove this for protocols without re-voting and
assume such protocols in the rest of this section.
Uniqueness(Auth) states that whenever any recorded ballots
are published and Auth is not considered dishonest according
to Faulty(Auth, b) for some b 6=⊥, then each recorded ballot
b′ has been sent by a unique eligible voter H for which
castBy(b′) = H . Thereby, the ballot can be sent as part of a
larger composed message. To express that a message m′ is a
subterm of another message m, we write m ` m′. As everyone
can evaluate Faulty(Auth, b), the property’s preconditions and
thus Uniqueness(Auth) are verifiable by everyone.
Definition 7. Let the length of the list [b] be n.
Uniqueness(Auth) := {tr | b 6=⊥ ∧tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b)
∧BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ j ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∧ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} =⇒
∃[H], i′, j′, A1, A2,m1,m2. BBH([H]) ∈ tr
∧castBy([b]i) = [H]i′ ∧ castBy([b]j) = [H]j′
∧send([H]i′ , A1,m1) ∈ tr ∧ send([H]j′ , A2,m2) ∈ tr
∧m1 ` [b]i ∧m2 ` [b]j ∧ (i 6= j =⇒ [H]i′ 6= [H]j′)}.
The property’s guarantees are similar to eligibility verifiabil-
ity [24] in that both state that each element of a list on the
bulletin board is associated with a unique eligible voter and we
compare the two notions in more detail in [6, Appendix C3].
Note that the property can only hold for protocols where the
list of eligible voters is publicly known.
Intuitively, if a protocol satisfies Uniqueness(Auth), then a
ballot recorded for the voter H implies that H cast it. Thus, for
any ballot that was not cast by H , Auth cannot convincingly
claim the contrary and an honest voter is thus protected in
disputes D2. In particular, the traces in the protocol also
satisfy VoterA(Auth). We prove the following theorem in [6,
Appendix B].
Theorem 2. Let Pr be a protocol in our class without re-voting
and where a voter who abstains does not send any message
and let T be a topology in our class.
∀tr ∈ TR(Pr, T ).
tr ∈ Uniqueness(Auth) =⇒ tr ∈ VoterA(Auth).
The theorem has the practical application that, while it is
often unclear how VoterA(Auth) can be directly realized,
Uniqueness(Auth) can easily be achieved using standard tech-
niques, such as voters signing their ballots. We provide an
example in Section VI-D.
C. How to use our formalism
Given the above results, our formalism can be used to
analyze whether a protocol Pr and topology T in our class
of voting protocols satisfy all dispute resolution properties
introduced in Section IV. If there is no topology T1, . . . , T7 in
Figure 3, such that Ti v T , then we can immediately conclude,
by Theorem 1, that TimelyP(Auth) and AuthP(Auth) cannot
hold while the protocol is also functional. Otherwise, analysis
is required whether the properties are indeed satisfied by Pr.
First, let Pr be a protocol that defines a dispute resolution
procedure, i.e., specifies the set Faulty. Our formalism is
mainly intended for this case and can directly be used to
analyze whether VoterC(Auth), TimelyP(Auth), VoterA(Auth),
and AuthP(Auth) hold in such a protocol. In protocols without
re-voting that satisfy Uniqueness(Auth) and the precondi-
tions of Theorem 2, VoterA(Auth) can also be proven by
proving Uniqueness(Auth) and concluding VoterA(Auth) by
Theorem 2.
If a protocol Pr does not define a dispute resolution pro-
cedure Faulty then our properties are also undefined. Never-
theless, one can still try to define a verdict Faulty using the
protocol’s specified signals BB, Ev, and Pub and the terms
contained in these signals. Our formalism can then be used to
establish for each such Faulty which properties are satisfied.
However, to prove that no definition of Faulty achieves dispute
resolution, all possible combinations and relations of the above
signals and their terms must be considered. Thus, it is in
general not straightforward to efficiently conclude that no
appropriate definition of Faulty exists for a given protocol.
D. A mixnet-based voting protocol with dispute resolution
To demonstrate the applicability of our formalism, we next
analyze MixVote, a standard mixnet-based voting protocol
inspired by [5] with a dispute resolution procedure similar
to [28]. In particular, we show how Faulty is instantiated,
how the properties VoterC(Auth) and TimelyP(Auth) differ in
practice, and that our dispute resolution properties are compat-
ible with standard voting properties, such as verifiability and
receipt-freeness. Due to space constraints, we only describe the
protocol’s main features here, omitting some details such as
the auditor’s role and the precise definition of some functions
and equations in the term algebra. For the detailed protocol
specification, the properties’ formal definitions, and the proofs
we refer to [6, Appendix C].
1) Topology: We consider a topology TMV that is as T4 in
Figure 3d, except that there is also a trusted off-line device D,
which is connected to the voter H by (bidirectional) secure,
default channels. TMV specifies reliable channels between H
and the platform P and between P and the authority Auth.
Also, P and Auth are partially trusted to forward messages
and reply to messages, respectively. Thus, by Theorem 1, it is
possible to achieve TimelyDR in the topology TMV.
2) Protocol: We present the protocol as a message sequence
chart, where each role is depicted by a vertical life line
and where the box on top names the role. A role’s life line
denotes the role’s events, ordered sequentially. A role’s sent
and received messages are depicted on top of arrows that start
at the sender and end at the recipient. Also, we denote explicit
signals by solid squares and the roles’ internal computations
by dashed squares.
MixVote’s simplified specification is depicted in Figure 4.
The protocol’s setup specifies that at each point in time, only
one election takes place (i.e., there are no parallel sessions) and
each voter possesses a unique trusted device D to which he
has exclusive access. All devices are equipped with a unique
signing key skD and the authority with a unique secret key
skAuth. The corresponding verification keys from the devices
[pkD] are known to Auth and Auth’s public key pkAuth is known
D H P Auth BB
knows(H, 〈D,P,BB, v〉) knows(Auth, 〈skAuth, [pkD]〉)
knows(BB, 〈Auth, [pkD], pkAuth, [H]〉)knows(D, 〈H,Auth, pkAuth, skD〉) knows(P, 〈H,Auth〉)
Vote(H, v) BBpkD([pkD]),BBpk(pkAuth)
BBH([H]),Corr([H, pkD])
v
b = encrypt v under pkAuth
and sign result with skD
b
Ballot(H, b)
b b
If valid, add b to [b]
{b}skAuth{b}skAuth
Ev(b, {b}skAuth) [v] = Tally([b])
[b], [v]
BBrec([b]),BBtal([v])
End
[b]
verifyC(H, b)
For b =⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {}.
For b 6=⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {tr |(∃[b], pkAuth, c. BBpk(pkAuth) ∈ tr ∧ Ev(b, c) ∈ tr ∧ ver(c, pkAuth) = b ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b /∈ [b])
∨(∃[b], [pkD]. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ BBpkD([pkD]) ∈ tr ∧ not all ballots in [b] contain a signature associated with a unique key in [pkD])}
Fig. 4: Simplified protocol specification for MixVote, without the auditor role and the full function definitions. Here pkD =
pk(skD), pkAuth = pk(skAuth), and castBy(b) = H holds iff ∃pk. ver(b, pk) 6=⊥ ∧〈H, pk〉 ∈ [H, pk] ∧ Corr([H, pk]) ∈ tr . The
protocol’s setup specifies a single agent Auth, that each voter H is associated with a unique trusted off-line device D, and
that there is no restriction on the relation between voters H and platforms P . The role for a voter H who abstains consists of
receiving the list of recorded ballots from the bulletin board followed by the signal verifyA(H, ∅).
to all devices. Moreover, all these public keys are published
on BB (denoted by the signals BBpkD and BBpk, respectively).
Additionally, at the protocol’s start BB knows and publishes
the list of eligible voters [H] (denoted by the signal BBH)
and which verification key corresponds to which voter. The
latter is denoted by the signal Corr([H, pkD]), where each pair
〈H, pkD〉 in the list denotes that the signing key corresponding
to pkD is installed on H’s device.
To vote, a voter H uses his device D to compute the
ballot as follows: the vote is encrypted under Auth’s public
key and signed by the device. Then, the voter casts his ballot
by entering it on any platform P , which forwards it over the
network to Auth. For each received ballot b, Auth checks b’s
validity, namely whether b contains a signature corresponding
to an eligible voter who has not previously voted. If this is the
case, Auth adds b to the list of recorded ballots [b]. Moreover,
as in other protocols [28], to achieve dispute resolution, Auth
sends back a confirmation to the voter H . The confirmation
consists of H’s ballot b signed by Auth and serves as evidence
that b was indeed received by the authority. The voter keeps
this confirmation as evidence for later disputes (indicated by
the signal Ev).
After the voting phase, Auth computes the tally from the
recorded ballots [b]. For this, a standard mixnet is used to de-
crypt the ballots. This procedure has the properties that no one
can learn the correspondence between the encrypted ballots
and the decrypted votes. Nevertheless, the mixnet produces
evidence, which is published by Auth on the bulletin board,
that allows everyone to verify that the tally was computed
correctly. We describe the detailed functions and equations
modeling the Tally function in [6, Appendix C1]. Also, we
describe there the detailed information that is produced by the
mixnet and published on BB and how an auditor inspects this
information to verify the tally.
Among other information, Auth publishes on BB the
recorded ballots [b] and the votes in the final tally [v], as shown
in Figure 4. This allows a voter to read the recorded ballots
on BB and verify that his ballot is included in this list.
A voter who abstains does not send any messages. After the
results are published, he reads the list of recorded ballots [b] on
BB and believes at that step that no ballot should be recorded
for him, which is denoted by the signal verifyA(H, ∅).
We complete the protocol’s specification with the definitions
of the function castBy and the dispute resolution procedure
Faulty. castBy specifies that a ballot b is considered to be
cast by the voter H if the ballot’s signature can be verified
with the verification key that is associated with H . Faulty
specifies that Auth is considered dishonest in all traces where
(a) some agent possesses evidence consisting of a ballot b
signed by Auth that is not included in the recorded ballots [b]
on the bulletin board or (b) not all published recorded ballots
[b] contain a signature of a unique eligible voter. castBy is
defined in Figure 4’s caption and the description of Faulty is
given in Figure 4, although we omit here the details of how
we model (b).
3) Dispute resolution: Intuitively, by the channel and trust
assumptions, each voter who casts a ballot b receives, be-
fore the election’s end, a confirmation. As this confirmation
serves as evidence that b must be on BB, VoterC(Auth) and
TimelyP(Auth) hold. Furthermore, since no one can forge
Auth’s signature, for a ballot b that was not actually received by
Auth no one can produce (false) evidence that b should be on
BB. Thus, Auth cannot be falsely convicted and AuthP(Auth)
holds too. Moreover, Uniqueness(Auth) holds because, when
Faulty does not hold in an execution, all recorded ballots are
signed (and thus were sent) by a unique eligible voter. In
particular, Uniqueness(Auth) implies VoterA(Auth) in MixVote.
To understand the difference between VoterC(Auth) and
TimelyP(Auth), take a topology T ′MV equal to TMV except that
Auth is untrusted. Assume for simplicity that a voter can
interpret whether Auth’s signature on the confirmation is valid.
In reality, this would require an additional protocol step where
the voter uses a device. When the protocol is run in T ′MV,
it satisfies VoterC(Auth), as a voter only proceeds with his
verifiability check when he has previously received a valid
confirmation that convinces everyone that his ballot must be
recorded. However, TimelyP(Auth) is violated as Auth may
never reply with a valid confirmation and thus block a voter.
Consequently, there is an unresolved dispute where an outside
observer cannot tell whether a voter did not cast a ballot or the
authority did not send a confirmation. In contrast, when the
protocol is run in topology TMV, Auth always sends a timely
response and such disputes do not occur.
4) Standard voting properties: In addition to the dispute
resolution properties, we prove in [6, Appendix C] that
MixVote satisfies end-to-end verifiability, consisting of individ-
ual verifiability and tallied-as-recorded, as well as eligibility
verifiability [24]. Tallied-as-recorded and eligibility verifiabil-
ity are two universal verifiability properties that respectively
denote that an auditor can verify that the recorded ballots
are correctly counted in the final tally and that each vote
in the final tally was cast by a unique eligible voter. We
also prove that MixVote satisfies receipt-freeness [18], which
denotes that a voter cannot prove to the adversary how he
voted, even when he provides the adversary with all secrets
that he knows. Intuitively, receipt-freeness holds because the
adversary cannot access the voter’s device D. Moreover, the
evidence used for disputes only contains the ballot and does
not reveal the underlying (encrypted) vote.
5) Proofs: We prove in [6, Appendix C4] and by the
Tamarin files in [33] that MixVote satisfies all above mentioned
properties when run in the topology TMV. In particular, we
establish most of the properties by automatically proving
them for one voter who casts a ballot in Tamarin and by
proving them for an arbitrary number of voters by pen-
and-paper proofs. The only exceptions are: receipt-freeness,
which we prove by Tamarin’s built in support for observa-
tional equivalence [3]; VoterA(Auth), which we deduce (by
hand) from Uniqueness(Auth) using Theorem 2; and end-to-
end verifiability which we deduce (by hand) from individual
verifiability and tallied-as-recorded.
VII. RELATED WORK
A. Dispute resolution in poll-site voting protocols
The idea of dispute resolution has been informally con-
sidered for poll-site voting protocols. In [17], the property
considered is called non-repudiation and requires that failures
“can not only be detected, but (in most cases) demonstrated”
and that no false convictions can be made. [2] informally
considers the properties contestability and defensibility, which
are similar to our dispute resolution properties in that they also
protect the honest voters and the honest authority. Contesta-
bility requires that some guarantees hold for a voter when he
starts the voting process at a polling station. In contrast, our
properties TimelyP(Auth) and VoterC(Auth) are also suitable
for remote settings and respectively make guarantees once a
voter casts his ballot and believes that it should be recorded.
Moreover, [2]’s definitions are informal and they do not
consider timeliness.
In most poll-site voting protocols that consider dispute
resolution, voters receive a confirmation as evidence that their
ballot was accepted by the authority [8], [11], [12], [14], [17],
[22], [36]. In some protocols [11], [17], this confirmation
contains the authority’s digital signature. In the protocols based
on Scantegrity [12], [14], [22], [36] the confirmation consists
of a code that is (physically) hidden on the ballot by invisible
ink and revealed when a voter marks his choice. A voter’s
knowledge of a valid code serves as evidence that he voted
for a candidate. Thus, when a wrong ballot is recorded, a voter
can prove the authority’s dishonesty by revealing the code.
Compared to remote voting settings, poll-site protocols
profit from the fact that on-site witnesses can observe certain
actions. For example, if voters are repeatedly prevented from
casting their ballots, this is visible to other voters and auditors
in the polling station. Some protocols [22] even explicitly
state that voters should publicly declare some decisions be-
fore entering them on the voting machine to avoid disputes
regarding whether the voting machine correctly followed their
instructions. Our notion of undeniable channels allows one to
formally consider such assumptions during protocol analysis.
B. Dispute resolution in remote voting protocols
Remotegrity [37] is a remote voting protocol based on
Scantegrity, where paper sheets are sent to the voters by
postal mail and ballots are cast over the Internet. As with
Scantegrity II and III [12], [14], [36], to achieve dispute
resolution some codes on these sheets are obscured by a
scratch-off surface. If a voter detects a (valid) ballot that is
incorrectly recorded for him, he can show to anyone that he
has not yet scratched off the relevant codes on his sheets and
thus the authority must have falsely recorded this ballot.
[37] discusses several dispute scenarios with respect to
whether a ballot is recorded correctly. However, it is stated
that “The [authority] can always force a denial-of-service [..]
What Remotegrity does not allow is the [authority] to fully
accept (i.e., accept and lock) any ballot the voter did not cast
without the voter being able to dispute it.” Thus, the focus is
on disputes D2 in Figure 2, while timeliness in disputes D1
is not further explored. Moreover, the considered properties
as well as the assumed setting are not specified precisely and
thus the properties cannot be proven. In contrast, our model
enables specifying detailed adversary and system assumptions
and provides definitions of dispute resolution properties that
can be formally analyzed.
C. Accountability
Our dispute resolution properties are closely related to
different notions of accountability [10], [25], [26]. Both ac-
countability and our properties formalize how misbehaving
protocol participants are identified. While the accountability
definitions are generic and allow one to blame different
agents in different situations, we focus on understanding what
disputes and properties are relevant for voting.
Two accountability definitions have been instantiated for
voting protocols. First, accountability due to Küsters et al. [26]
was instantiated for Bingo Voting [9] in [26], for Helios [1]
in [27], and for sElect [28]. These instantiated notions of
accountability state that when a defined goal is violated, then
some (dishonest) agents can be blamed by a judge. A judge
may blame multiple parties. As a result, in [27] accountability
does not guarantee an unambiguous verdict when a voter
claims that his ballot is incorrectly recorded. That is, the
property does not guarantee the resolution of such disputes
even when the voter is honest. The same holds in [26] and [28]
for disputes where a voter claims that he did not receive
a required confirmation. To avoid ambiguous verdicts, [26]
proposes an alternative accountability property where voters’
claims that they did not receive a required confirmation are
just ignored. However, this property does not guarantee that
the authority is blamed in all situations where an (honest)
voter’s ballot is not recorded correctly and dispute resolution
does not hold.
Second, accountability due to Bruni et al. [10] has been
instantiated for Bingo Voting in [10]. In this work, account-
ability tests decide whether a given agent should be blamed.
However, the accountability test takes as input a ballot and a
confirmation that the voter received when casting his ballot.
Thus disputes where a voter claims that he cannot receive a
confirmation are not considered at all.
In contrast to these two accountability notions, we also
consider and resolve disputes where a voter claims that he
did not receive a required response from Auth after casting
the ballot by the property TimelyP(Auth). Moreover, our
topology characterization allows us to quickly assess when
given assumptions are insufficient to satisfy TimelyP(Auth).
D. Other related properties
Collection accountability [7] states that when a vote is in-
correctly collected, the voter should be provided with evidence
to convince an “independent party” that this is the case, but
it has neither been formally defined nor analyzed. Dispute
freeness [32] states that there is never a dispute. This property
is considered in voting protocols where voters are modeled
as machines that conduct an election by engaging in a multi-
party protocol [35], [23] and is thus inappropriate for large
scale elections where voters must be assumed to have limited
computational capabilities. Finally, the FOO protocol [20]
allows voters to claim that something went wrong. However,
without additional assumptions, FOO does not satisfy our
dispute resolution properties. In particular, the signed ballot
a voter receives does not prove that the counter, who is
responsible for tallying, has received the ballot.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Dispute resolution is an essential ingredient for trustworthy
elections and worthy of a careful, formal treatment. Based
on a systematic analysis of disputes, we proposed new dis-
pute resolution properties and introduced timeliness as an
important aspect thereof. We fully characterized all topologies
that achieve timeliness. This provides a formal account for
the intuition that timeliness requires strong assumptions. For
example, it is not achievable in standard remote voting settings
where a network adversary can simply drop messages.
While we have focused on necessary assumptions for dis-
pute resolution, in real elections there are other properties,
notably privacy, which may require other assumptions. As
future work, we would like to investigate how our topology
hierarchy must be adapted for these properties and to char-
acterize the required assumptions for them. The combination
of such results with our characterization could lead to new
insights about the possibility of achieving different properties
simultaneously. Furthermore, such combined results could be a
starting point to identify the topologies enabling all properties
required in voting; this would help in election design to
quickly assess the minimal required setups.
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